The Boeing B-737 MAX accidents represent a major failure of the aviation regulatory system. Current airworthiness standards are antiquated in their essence (mainly prescriptive) and inadequate for integrating new technologies. There have been calls to reform the system to allow more innovation and less bureaucracy and studies warning about the deficient approach for certifying new computer-based systems. Compliance enforcement by the national regulatory bodies has become also progressively less effective because of the ever-widening skill gap between regulators and industry. The regulatory bodies should move from rules- based certification to risk-based certification. They should emphasize qualitative performance requirements (minimum failure/fault tolerance depending on consequence severity) and use of hazard analyses during design. Deemphasize quantitative performance requirements as “true” measure of safety but use them as design goal to support qualitative performance requirements. Finally, independent supporting organizations should be established by regulatory bodies to get access to current technical and scientific skilled resources at level equal (or better) of industry to perform peer system safety reviews.